This paper explores the determinants of sovereign bond yields during the classical gold standard period . Using the Pooled Mean Group methodology, we …nd that the main bene…t of the gold standard was as a short-hand device that enhanced a country's reputation in international capital markets. By conveying important information to investors and enhancing the speed of adjustment of sovereign bond spreads to long-run equilibrium levels, the gold standard allowed country risk to be priced more e¤ectively. In contrast to other studies, our results suggest that fundamental factors were more important in determining a country's creditworthiness in the long-run than the exchange rate regime per se.
Introduction
Membership of the gold standard is often regarded as a signi…cant factor driving yield spreads on sovereign bonds issued during the period leading up to World War One. A seminal study by Bordo and Rocko¤ (1996) argues that adherence to the gold standard served as a 'good housekeeping seal of approval', shaving as much as 40 basis points o¤ sovereign bond spreads. 1 An important recent contribution, using a much larger country sample and a wider range of macroeconomic variables, by Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) also con…rms the role played by the gold standard in enhancing sovereign credibility before 1914. Their …ndings also indicate that, to a large extent, country risk was priced without much reference to fundamental macroeconomic variables such as the level of public debt and the terms of trade.
While such results suggest that the exchange rate regime plays an important role in the long-run determination of spreads, they shed little light on how it helps a country acquire a reputation for …nancial probity. A country's reputation for creditworthiness in previous periods is likely to have a substantial bearing on its current reputation. This may be because the 'type' of policymaker running the country could change over time in ways not readily transparent to foreign lenders. 2 Creditors, therefore, are required to constantly update their beliefs about the type of policymakers that they face. With Bayesian updating of country risk, bond spreads are likely to exhibit a high degree of persistence and deviate from steady state levels for a long time. These deviations are likely to vary from country to country, particularly if investors are wary of 'emerging'countries at the periphery of the international …nancial system. Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) tackle the dynamics of country risk using a lagged dependent variable model with the Arellano-Bond (1991) one-step dynamic panel estimation technique 1 A number of country-speci…c studies …nd similar results. See, for example, Sussman and Yafeh (2000) and Lazaretou (2005) for the cases of Japan and Greece. 2 For example, policymaker types could change unobservably over time and a reputation is gradually built as a 'disciplined'type separates himself from other types (Mailath and Samuelson, 2001) . Alternatively, leadership changes may have a causative e¤ect on economic growth and change perceptions of creditworthiness (see Jones and Olken, 2005) . estimated by the generalised method of moments (GMM). But, as Pesaran et al. (1999) observe, the Arellano-Bond technique can lead to inconsistent estimates in heterogeneous dynamic panels when the time dimension, T; is large. There is a risk, therefore, of misleading inferences about the true determinants of spreads and the long-run e¤ect of the gold standard on country risk. Moreover, the Arellano-Bond approach does not permit heterogeneity in the short-run adjustment process for yield spreads. So, little can be said about how the gold standard contributed to reputation building by di¤erent countries at the 'core' and 'periphery'of the international …nancial system.
In this paper, we examine the evolution of sovereign spreads in the pre-World War One era using a similar (though not identical) dataset to Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) . We use the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) technique of Pesaran et al. (1999) to derive consistent estimates for the determinants of country risk and examine the (di¤ering) speeds of adjustment towards long-run equilibrium. Our …ndings are as follows. First, the prime bene…t of gold standard membership appears to arise through a more rapid convergence of spreads towards their long-run equilibrium, suggesting that membership conveyed important information to investors that enabled them to price risk more e¤ectively. Second, and in contrast to Obstfeld and Taylor, gold standard adherence was not, by itself, su¢ cient to drive borrowing terms.
Rather, investors appear to have attached signi…cance to fundamental variables such as low in ‡ation, …scal balances, and levels of economic development when pricing sovereign risk in equilibrium.
Our paper is related to several recent cross-country studies of the gold standard era. Meissner (2005) examines the timing of adoption of the gold standard and shows that countries with large borrowing costs and signi…cant trading relationships with other gold standard members were more likely to …x their exchange rates earlier. Mauro et al. (2002) provide evidence suggesting that investors in the pre-World War One era paid particular attention to country-speci…c fundamentals when pricing risk. Flandreau and Zumer (2004) argue that the gold standard may have played a much more modest role in the evolution of the global …nancial system than hitherto assumed. But their use of feasible generalised least squares (FGLS) with large panel data dimensions also raises the spectre of inconsistent estimates stressed by Pesaran et al. (1999) and Pesaran and Smith (1995) . Ferrucci (2003) also uses the PMG approach to study the determinants of sovereign bond spreads. His focus, however, is on a panel of countries covering the recent period 1992 -2002.
He …nds that while bond spreads re ‡ect fundamentals, non-fundamental factors also play a signi…cant role. Unlike the present paper, his analysis of short-run dynamics focuses on the gap between the equilibrium and observed level of spreads and does not consider the role played by the exchange rate regime in in ‡uencing the adjustment to equilibrium. Obstfeld et al. (2005) study the extent to which the gold standard in ‡uenced the degree to which countries in the international monetary system followed the world (i.e. the UK) interest rate. Using a similar dynamic equilibrium correction technique to ours (Pesaran et al., 2001) , they suggest that the classical gold standard era was a period of limited monetary independence, consistent with the capital market openness of the time. By comparing the adjustment periods of country interest rates to long-run equilibrium periods, they contrast the rapid transmission of interest rate shocks with the greater monetary autonomy of the postWorld War Two Bretton Woods era. But their analysis does not consider the fundamental determinants of country risk or how it may have evolved di¤erently in 'core'and 'periphery' countries.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the econometric framework and motivates the PMG methodology. Section 3 presents the main results and discusses the preferred parsimonious speci…cation. Section 4 considers the robustness and sensitivity of our results. Section 5 concludes. Details of data sources and diagnostic tests are contained in the Appendix A and B respectively.
Econometric Framework

Data
Our data is annual and covers twenty-two countries between 1872 -1913. The sample begins in 1872 since many countries join the gold standard from the mid-1870s onwards giving a more balanced panel dataset. We follow Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) and separate countries into 'core'and 'periphery'. The 'core'countries are predominantly Anglo-Saxon and European, namely Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Sweden, the United States and the United Kingdom. The 'peripheral'or 'emerging market'countries in the sample are: Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Chile, Greece, India, Italy, Japan, Portugal and Spain. Our sample di¤ers from Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) in that it excludes South Africa, New Zealand, Turkey, Finland, Hungary, and Mexico, but includes Russia and the Netherlands. The Global Financial Database (GFD) and Mitchell (1992 Mitchell ( , 1993 Mitchell ( , 2000 are our primary sources. These data were corroborated against the datasets used by Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) and Flandreau and Zumer (2004) . Some missing gaps were …lled by consulting other recent studies of the gold standard era, for example, the nominal GDP. We take our measure of country risk to be the bond spread over UK consol yields.
The bond yields used are from gold or sterling bonds traded in the London capital market, and their attributes are described in Appendix A along with details of the selected control variables.
Figure (1) illustrates the average cost of external borrowing facing these countries in the pre-World War One period. It is clear that countries belonging to the 'core' of the international monetary system experienced much lower yield spreads than their counterparts on the 'periphery'. The di¤erence in the average spread between the two groups is 261 basis points and there is considerable diversity amongst countries. The 'core'countries typically faced borrowing costs that were 74 basis points above the UK rate, while the 'periphery' countries faced interest rates around 335 basis points above the UK rate. 
Model
Following Edwards (1986), Bordo and Rocko¤ (1996) and Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) , suppose that yield spreads are determined by the relationship:
where X it captures lagged control variables commonly used in country risk analysis such as the in ‡ation rate, the level of real GDP per capita, the M2 to GDP ratio, as well as 
where Y IELD U K;t is the risk free rate (i.e. the yield on UK consol bonds), and
is the GDP-weighted return on the global bond market portfolio.
The PMG approach to estimating (1) is appropriate for several reasons. 3 First, as explained in Pesaran and Smith (1995) and Pesaran et al. (1999) , the procedure yields consistent estimates given the dimension (N = 22 and T = 42) of the panel data. Although Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest that the full range of IVs in a GMM procedure helps ad- dress inconsistency, Pesaran et al. (1999) argue forcefully that the Arellano-Bond technique nonetheless delivers inconsistent long-run coe¢ cient estimates in heterogeneous dynamic panels when T is large. This is readily illustrated by the fact that di¤erent authors derive quite di¤erent conclusions on the determinants of yield spreads when using di¤erent sub-country and sub-period samples. Second, as a dynamic panel estimation procedure, it explicitly allows for di¤ering speeds of adjustment of the convergence of spreads towards the long-run equilibrium. The di¤erent dynamics of convergence of 'core'and 'periphery'countries suggested by Figure ( 2) points to the importance of taking this into account. Third, PMG allows estimation of heterogeneous short-run responses of countries to policy changes which could capture the nature of the data.
Our PMG model of sovereign risk is essentially a dynamic equilibrium correction equation of the form:
where Z it 1 is the set of explanatory variables, i are individual …xed e¤ects, and i the speeds of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium. For lagged dependent variables, we choose a maximum lag of one to preserve su¢ cient degrees of freedom. The short-run dynamics of the model are governed by the coe¢ cients of i , and 0 . As with Pesaran et al. (1999) , u it is assumed to be independently distributed across i and across t.
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The long-run equilibrium of yield spread for each country is:
where the it are stationary processes. For a long-run equilibrium to exist, i 6 = 0, and for convergence i < 0. To obtain the coe¢ cients of the long-run relationships, we follow the assumption of long-run homogeneity discussed in Pesaran et al. (1999) . This is done by taking the simple average of i 's across countries ( ), and multiplying it by i , 0 1 and 2 to obtain:
where 0i = i ;
In the estimated models of (3) and (4), the vector of explanatory variable enters with a lag order of one. Deviations from equilibrium are possible in the short-run.
In Section 3, we discuss the choice of variables in Z it 1 . Since the choice of suitable explanatory variables in the sovereign debt literature is typically ad hoc, we adopt the general to speci…c approach (Hendry and Richard, 1983 ) to test the model down to its parsimonious speci…cation. Unless stated otherwise, these variables enter equations (3) and (4) with a timing convention of t 1. To address potential endogeneity, we use a lag order of two for the in ‡ation rate and the variables that are expressed as a ratio of nominal GDP. The coding of the gold standard adherence dummy, GS it , is subjective. To make matters simple, the dummy is assigned the value 1 when countries formally announced their legal commitment to gold (de jure status).
Results
Feasible GLS and PMG Estimation
We begin by initially estimating equation (1) with the feasible generalised least squares method used by Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) . We then compare the results against the estimated PMG models of equations (3) and (4) . The bene…ts are two-fold. First, it checks the quality of our data. Second, it acts as a robustness check of the 'good housekeeping seal of approval'hypothesis on a somewhat di¤erent set of countries to that used by Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) . This may be relevant since some authors (e.g. Flandreau and Zumer, 2004) question the impact of gold standard adherence on yield spreads. In the …rst two estimations, we follow Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) and allow for the fact that some countries in the sample may have been in full or partial default. We, therefore, interact the gold standard dummy with a dummy registering defaults to gauge the extent to which investors were able to di¤erentiate between gold standard adherence and debt compliance.
The variable GS no def ault is de…ned as an interaction of the gold standard dummy with a dummy for no default on sovereign bonds, while the variable GS def ault is the interaction of the gold standard dummy with a dummy for episodes of default. Notes: Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses + signi…cant at 10%; * signi…cant at 5%; ** signi…cant at 1% Dependent variables: SPREAD: speci…cations 1 to 3; 5 to 7. DSPREAD: speci…cations 4 and 8.
All regressions contain country's …xed e¤ect and country-speci…c beta terms, but are not reported.
Regression 1.2 suggests that the coe¢ cient of GS no def ault (-0.18) is comparable to that obtained by Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) . Clearly, however, this variable could proxy for other omitted country characteristics. Regression 1.6 shows that, upon adding other variables, the coe¢ cient remains broadly unchanged and is signi…cant at the 5% level. 6 The key determinants of yield spreads for our sample are episodes of debt default, the level of economic development (measured by the log of real GDP per capita), and ability to pay (the log of exports/GDP).
This preliminary experiment is supportive of the …ndings of Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) .
As a further check, we consider the de jure de…nitions of the gold standard in isolation instead of jointly accounting for e¤ects of default episodes. In regression 1. A major shortcoming of the regressions reported in Table (1) is the somewhat ad hoc choice of explanatory variables. We therefore use the general to speci…c approach (Hendry and Richard, 1983 ) was used to test the model (see equation (3)) down to its parsimonious speci…cation (see Table ( 2)) using the PMG procedure. These regressions do not include country speci…c GS terms. 7 Since the analysis could be sensitive to the de…nition of the gold standard in a dynamic setting, we consider three variants. Regression 2.1 uses the simple gold standard dummy. The e¤ect of the gold standard is interpreted as a long-run phenomenon.
In regression 2.2, the gold standard variable is interacted with yield spreads, GSSP READ.
A large and negative coe¢ cient for GSSP READ would imply that the adoption of the gold standard shortens the time required for a country to converge to the steady state and reap the bene…ts of reduced yield spreads. This coe¢ cient could be interpreted as re ‡ecting the learning behaviour of investors as they update their assessments of country risk. Regression 2.3 allows for both the long-run and adjustment e¤ects of GS.
Several conclusions can be drawn from Table ( 2). First, there is a signi…cant equilibrium correction term ranging between 0.39 to 0.47. It suggests that yield spreads adjust fairly quickly to their equilibrium levels with an average half life of some 1.5 to 1.8 years following a shock or policy change.
Second, fundamental variables play an important role in spread determination. The level of economic development, as measured by log real GDP per capita, is signi…cant across all speci…cations. This variable is de…ned in terms of natural logarithms, so the coe¢ cient associated with it implies that a 1 unit increase in the log of real GDP per capita reduces spreads by 26 basis points (based on regression 2.2). 8 Besides economic development, the ratio of …scal balances (revenue minus expenditure) to nominal GDP, F ISCGDP , and the in ‡ation rate, IN F L are also signi…cant determinants of yield spreads. A large …scal surplus will lower a country's cost of borrowing as revenues improve ability to pay as well as serve as collateral. For every 1 percentage point increase in F ISCGDP , yield spreads are lowered by around 7 basis points in the long-run. Countries with a track record of high in ‡ation also face higher borrowing costs -a one percentage point rise in in ‡ation raises spreads by 5 basis Third, short-run dynamic terms are signi…cant determinants of yield spreads. suggests that the transmission of common interest rate shocks to yield spreads is also not instantaneous.
Across the three speci…cations in Table ( 2), regression 2.2 is the preferred model. In regression 2.1, the long-run impact of the gold standard on borrowing terms is clear to see. But without an interactive term between GS and yield spreads, it is hard to comment on the evolution of country risk. In regression 2.3, which models both long-run and adjustment e¤ects, we would not expect long-run e¤ects to show up strongly if the gold standard was purely a reputational device for investors to learn about a country. As regression 2.3 shows, the long-run coe¢ cient is insigni…cant (and incorrectly signed), while the adjustment coe¢ cient is signi…cant and of similar magnitude to the one in regression 2.2.
Returning to regression 2.2, the coe¢ cient of the gold standard interacted with the lagged 9 See Obstfeld et al. (2005) for a discussion of this issue. In a related study on the determinants of emerging market bond spread in the 1990s, Min (1998) found that external common shock, measured by the three-month US Treasury bill, is not signi…cant. This is also consistent with Antzoulatos (1996) who shows that the US interest rates matter little in the determination of bond ‡ows to the Latin economies in the 1990s. 10 We constrain the estimates of short run dynamic terms to be identical across countries to preserve su¢ cient degree of freedom.
yield spreads GSSP READ is estimated to be -0.16. On average, a country adopting the gold standard found its borrowing costs converging more quickly to long-run equilibrium levels.
In general, 'peripheral'countries joining the gold standard experience a more rapid spread convergence than the 'core' countries. For the sample as a whole, the imputed half life to achieve lower yield spreads upon adoption of gold standard alone (using regression 2.2)) is 4.4 years. 11 By contrast, with the interaction variable GSSP READ of regression 2.2 the half life is 1.8 years. 12 In other words, gold standard adherence may have allowed investors to price country risk much more e¤ectively.
The diagnostic tests for the three models (bottom rows of Table (2)) suggest that the parsimonious speci…cations may su¤er from mild heteroskedasticity problems. As highlighted earlier, the assumption of homoskedastic disturbances gives rise to consistent, but ine¢ cient,
estimates. So the presence of potential heteroskedasticity may not be severe enough to invalidate our …ndings. Furthermore, the p-values for these tests are much too close to us to exercise judgement on the choice of preferred model based on this criterion, especially between regressions 2.2 and 2.3. The LM bar test on the residual shows that there is no serial correlation. As such, a long-run cointegrating relation among the explanatory variables does exist for all three speci…cations. Regression 2.2 is our preferred speci…cation on grounds of economic intuition and for satisfying the panel cointegration test (which is more crucial amongst the diagnostic tests).
Half-lives
Recall that, for the existence of long-run equilibrium, it is necessary to have i 6 = 0. When i < 0, there is convergence to the long-run steady state equilibrium for each country. Table   ( 3) presents the speeds of adjustment i and half-life of countries for speci…cations reported in Table ( 2). These speeds of adjustment are well behaved in 17 out of 22 countries in 11 The value of half-life was imputed from the coe¢ cient of GSSP READ in regression 2.2. 12 This is obtained by 
13 There is an anomaly for two countries, India and Sweden, where speeds of adjustment are estimated at essentially zero. This could be because the steady state for these two countries is not being well captured by the model, and therefore the speed of adjustment is ill-de…ned. The overall results are not, in any case, sensitive to the inclusion of India and Sweden. 13 Countries with i = 0 are not reported in Table ( 3), and these are Canada, Chile and Greece. countries on average have a speed of adjustment of -0.50 which translates to a half-life of 1.8 years, whereas a 'peripheral'country has a speed of adjustment of -0.36 which yields a half-life of 2.5 years.
Another noteworthy feature is that Austria and Spain are estimated to have a relatively low half-life even though they did not adopt the gold standard regime at all during the period.
This reinforces the …ndings from Table ( 2) which show that the gold standard serves as a signaling device in the short-run and that fundamentals matter more in the long run.
Parsimonious Speci…cation
We now document the steps involved in obtaining the parsimonious speci…cation of regression 2.2 in Table (2). 14 For short-run dynamic terms, second di¤erences were considered. 15 These measure the acceleration of the chosen macroeconomic variables, and so attempt to re ‡ect any surprises in trends. Since some of these variables could be I(2), taking second order di¤erences is a conservative practice that creates stationary variables and ensures consistent estimates.
Regression 3.1 in Tables (4) and (5) considers all plausible explanatory variables in the dataset. In addition to those considered in Table ( 2), we also included: a measure of political conditions P OLIT Y 2, the level of …nancial development M 2GDP , and customs revenue as ratio of GDP, CU SREV GDP . The coe¢ cient of GSSP READ is estimated to be -0.08 which seems plausible (see regression 3.1). In regression 3.2, DDF ISCGDP , DDIN F L, DDLT OT and DDM 2GDP were …rst dropped as they were highly insigni…cant. P OLIT Y 2, an index measuring the degree of democracy, was estimated to have a positive, but insigni…-cant coe¢ cient -so we remove the variable. DDCU SREV GDP appears to have the wrong sign. The accumulation of custom revenues should typically reduce the cost of a country's borrowing rates in the gold standard era. DDLT OT , an open economy indicator for export competitiveness, was also dropped as it was insigni…cant.
In regression 3.3, we continue to remove wrongly signed and insigni…cant variables from regression 3.2. We now focus on the long-run equilibrium coe¢ cients. The measure of …nancial development re ‡ected by M 2GDP is negative but not signi…cant. A high level of indebtedness of a country, DEBT GDP , might be expected to lead to higher borrowing costs.
Again, the coe¢ cient is not signi…cant. Finally, open economy indicators like LEXP GDP
and LT OT were also generally insigni…cant. 16 In regression 3.4, we remove CU SREV GDP which correlates positively but not signi…cantly with yield spreads. Since higher custom revenues should enhance ability to repay, a positive e¤ect on yield spread seems counterintuitive.
High in ‡ation might indicate poor economic performance and signal prospective payments di¢ culties. In general, one would expect a positive relation between lagged in ‡ation (measured by annual change in CPI levels) and changes in yield spreads. Using the PMG estimator, the coe¢ cient of in ‡ation rate is unstable in regressions 3.1 to 3.4. In regression 3.5, we drop the in ‡ation rate to examine the implications. Since the magnitude and significant of the GSSP READ variable increases, it suggests potential signs of omitted variable bias. So, in regression 3.6, we restore the in ‡ation rate in the regression. A percentage point increase in in ‡ation adds 5 basis points to yield spreads. 16 These variables are also not signi…cant in Obstfeld and Taylor. 
Robustness
To further substantiate our results in regression 2.2 from Table 2 , we consider additional robustness and sensitivity checks. Speci…cally, we vary the degrees of long-and short-run heterogeneity.
In the general PMG setup, the basic speci…cation (3) matches a short-run dynamic term to every long-run coe¢ cient. By adopting the general to speci…c approach, we restrict the coe¢ cients of some of these short-run dynamic terms to be zero. We also restrict some of the short-run dynamics to be identical across countries. We …rst add DF ISCGDP into the regression since the long-run level e¤ect of …scal balance to GDP ratio is signi…cant. But this does not change the result quantitatively. Since F ISCGDP could be a fairly non-stationary process that is often related to business cycle properties, we consider DDF ISCGDP: But this does not change the outcome signi…cantly. As such, …scal balance is only important in the long-run.
The coe¢ cient of average W SP READ is not close to one in regression 2.2 of Table 2 . In using the variable, we have assumed that the relation between W SP READ and yield spreads remains homogeneous across countries. This may not be realistic given that di¤erent countries could have di¤erent long-run beta terms. So we relax the assumption on homogeneity in the long-run e¤ects of W SP READ. In doing so, we obtain point estimates of betas for each country. Ideally, one would expect these beta terms to be high for risky countries and low for the more developed countries. We do obtain beta terms greater than one for risky countries like Argentina (338 basis points) and Portugal (400 basis points). Whereas, the beta terms are less than one for the less risky countries like Belgium (41 basis points) and USA (24 basis points). We also obtain negative beta terms for some countries, notably Brazil and Denmark.
While it is conceivable that investments in these countries might pay o¤ when the world portfolio does not, it should be noted that these coe¢ cients may be imprecisely estimated -particularly since the introduction of additional variables lowers the e¤ective degrees of freedom. 17 As a next step, we add, in turn, DSP READ i , DW SP READ i , DIN F L i and DERV AR i to evaluate the e¤ects of heterogenous short-run dynamic terms. This again attempts to identify these e¤ects separately compared to Table 2 where they are restricted to be the homogenous e¤ects. In these separate experiments, the coe¢ cient of core economic variables (i.e. the level of economic development, …scal balance to GDP ratio and exchange rate variability) remains stable and robust across speci…cations.
We then add W SP READ i and estimate with the sequential addition of DSP READ i , DW SP READ i , DIN F L i and DERV AR i until we reach the general form of PMG speci…cation (3). The gold standard is found to reduce yield spreads by 5.2 to 6.5 basis points during the adjustment process. These variables were marginally insigni…cant around the 10% level, re ‡ecting the large number of coe¢ cient estimated. This also applies to the rest of the key explanatory variables as well. Given limited data at annual frequency, it is best to …x at least some short-run dynamic terms to be homogeneous across countries.
Conclusion
This paper has examined the determinants of sovereign yield spreads during the classical Gold Standard era between 1872 and 1913, in a way that takes into account the dynamics of investor perceptions of country risk. Speci…cally, the Pooled Mean Group methodology is used to consistently estimate di¤ering speeds of adjustment across a panel of twentytwo countries. One rationalisation of these di¤ering speeds of response is that international investors gradually updated their beliefs about the creditworthiness of di¤erent countries at di¤erent speeds.
Our …ndings are supportive of the conventional 'seal of approval'hypothesis about Gold Standard membership. But by using the PMG methodology, we …nd that membership of 17 As Özler (1989) observes, betas estimated with other variables are not strictly betas in the CAPM sense. Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) do not report their beta terms, so a comparison of results is not readily possible. the gold standard did not have a direct impact on sovereign spreads to the exclusion of other factors. Rather, the gold standard served as a short-hand device that facilitated a country's reputation in international capital markets. Investors remained concerned about country-speci…c fundamentals, such as in ‡ation and the …scal balance, but relied on the gold standard to convey this information more swiftly. By enhancing the speed of adjustment of sovereign spreads to their long-run equilibrium levels, gold standard membership facilitated the e¢ cient pricing of sovereign risk. Table ( 6) for summary statistics. The following table presents the …rst-order autocorrelations of yields:
Exchange Rate (ER)
All exchange rates are from the GFD. The original series de…nes exchange rate to be the price of domestic currency per unit price of US dollars. Here, the year-end value is used and the numeraire converted to sterling pounds.
Gold Standard (GS)
The gold standard dummy takes the value of one when the country has o¢ cially announced adoption of de jure gold standard, otherwise it takes the value of zero. Experimentation was done interacting this dummy variable with full and partial default episodes. These were taken from Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) . The main source of gold standard coding is from Bordo and Schwartz (1996) , and corroborated against Meissner (2005) . The coding for the following countries were found to have discrepancies amongst various authors. Spain: We use data from Meissner (2005) .
In ‡ation (IN F L)
In ‡ation is measured as the year-on-year change in the CPI index. 1913 is used as the base year. Data are collected from GFD, and missing series are taken from Flandreau and Zumer (2004) . 
Fiscal Balance/GDP (F ISCGDP )
Fiscal balance = government revenue -government expenditure. The main source is Mitchell (various issues). Government revenue refers to the current revenues exclusive of loans, with their main tax constituents. Government (total) expenditures includes capital items which are normally …nanced by borrowing. As argued in Mitchell, the most reluctant omission has been any disaggregation of government expenditure. But this heterogeneous data changes in nature frequently, and is often not available in a meaningful form.
Money Supply
M1 is de…ned as the sum of bank note in circulation and deposits in commercial banks.
M2 is the sum of M1 and deposits in savings. Source: Mitchell (various issues). Portugal: Real GDP from Mata and Valerio (1996) . This original series is converted into nominal terms using the GDP de ‡ator (1994 = 100).
Exchange Rate Volatility (ERV AR)
Exchange rate variability is constructed using methodology following Flandreau and Zumer (2004 
B Diagnostic Tests
This appendix explains various diagnostic tests essential for the PMG procedure. Given that this is a historical dataset and there are missing observations, this unbalanced panel dataset is a challenge for the implementation of standard diagnostic tests. Instead of brute-force applications, the following discusses how some tests were modi…ed.
B.1 Heteroskedasticity
As discussed in Baltagi (1995) , the assumption of homoskedastic disturbances in the presence of heteroskedasticity gives consistent but not e¢ cient estimates. This means that the standard errors of estimates will be biased, leading to inaccurate statistical inference. The problem can be recti…ed by robust standard errors like in Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) . But these authors stop short of testing whether heteroskedasticity exists in the …rst place. The presence of heteroskedasticity is assumed.
One of the tests for panel level heteroskedasticity involves conducting panel speci…c iterative GLS procedure on the disturbance terms. 18 This estimates panel level heteroskedasticity and saves the likelihood function. Next, the estimated disturbances of the model are assumed to be homoskedastic. A log-likelihood ratio (LR) test is performed to test these likelihood 18 See http://www.stata.com/support/faqs/stat/panel.html.
functions with the degrees of freedom determined by the number of constraints imposed, that is, the number of groupings. When this test was applied to the data, the estimation under panel level heteroskedasticity yielded positive log-likelihood values. This re ‡ects the fact that the log-likelihood function is a probability density function instead of a probability value. On the other hand, the log-likelihood estimate for homoskedastic errors is negative.
This results in unconventional negative LR test statistics.
In what follows, panel level heteroskedasticity is tested following the White test:
If the null hypotheses for 1 = 2 = 0 are not rejected, the disturbances are homoskedastic.
B.2 Unit Root Tests
The common tests are Levin and Lin (1992) 
where x it is the variable of interest, and H 0 : = 0. Rejection of the null hypothesis means the variable is non-stationary and is I(1) in levels. To test for stationarity in di¤erences,
Acceptance of the null hypothesis suggests the variable is stationary and is I(0) in di¤erence. Table (9) shows the Levin-Lin tests for the set of variables considered in our regressions.
The tests could not reject the null of panel unit root for log of terms of trade, log real GDP per capita and log nominal GDP. One of the limitations of the Levin-Lin test is that is assumed to be the same for all groups, that is, all countries'variables converge at the same rate. Since the dataset here includes countries with diverse experiences, it is not surprising that unit root is violated for growth related variables.
As the Levin-Lin test is restrictive, the data is tested with the IPS test (see Table (10)) which relaxes the assumption that 1 = 2 = ::: = N . Instead of pooling the data, separate unit root tests were performed on the N countries in the dataset. A test statistic based on the average of an augmented Dickey-Fuller regression is computed. This is also known as the LM t-bar test. Furthermore, this method is superior to Levin-Lin since it allows for residual serial correlation, and heterogeneity of dynamics and error variances across groups. For both tests, only …xed e¤ects without time trend are considered. Lag length was …xed at one. From Table ( 10) , the null of panel unit root is not rejected for M2 to GDP ratio, debt to GDP ratio, log real GDP per capita and log nominal GDP. Due to the heterogenous nature of the IPS alternative hypothesis (that is, each i is di¤erent), IPS (2003:74) suggest a rejection of the null hypothesis does not necessarily imply that the null is rejected for all groups. So, the presence of serial correlation may not a¤ect the PMG analysis severely. 
